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Abstract
Thirty physical education students and 30 music education students
read a passage that could be given either a prison break or a wrestling
interpretation, and another passage that could be understood in terms of
an evening of card playing or a rehearsal session of a woodwind ensemble.
Scores on disambiguating multiple choice tests and theme-revealing disam-
biguations and intrusions in free recall showed striking relationships to
the subject's background. These results indicate that high-level schemata
provide the interpretative framework for comprehending discourse. The
fact that most subjects gave each passage one distinct interpretation or
another and reported being unaware of other perspectives while reading
suggest that schemata can cause a person to see a message in a certain
way, without even considering alternative interpretations.
Frameworks for Comprehending Discourse
This formal and pure condition of sensibility to which the employ-
ment of the concept of understanding is restricted, we shall en-
title the schema of the concept . o The concept 'dog' signifies
a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure
of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to
any single determinate figure such as experience, or any possible
image that I can represent in concreto, actually presents. This
schematism of our understanding, in its application to appearances
and their mere form, is an art concealed in the depths of the human
soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to
allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 1781, pp. 182-183
Students from first grade through graduate school are expected to learn
about most matters from being told. Periodically reformers call for experi-
ence-based programs, but nevertheless the schools still have a manifestly
literate bias (Olson, 1976). The reliance upon language is based on assump-
tions so widely taken for granted that they are seldom even expressed, let
alone challenged. It is simply assumed that knowledge can be expressed in
printed language, and that a skilled reader can acquire knowledge from
reading. On this view, each word, each well-formed sentence, and every
satisfactory text passage "has" a meaning. The meaning is conceived to be
"in" the language, to have a status independent from the speaker and hearer,
or author and reader. On this view, a failure to comprehend a nondefective
communication can in principle always be traced to a language-specific
deficit. This is a theorem which follows directly from the axioms that
knowledge is expressible in language and, symmetrically, that the skilled
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reader can decode the language into knowledge. Therefore, it is assumed,
difficulties in comprehension can be traced to failures of skill. Some of
the words may not be in the reader's vocabulary. A rule of grammar may have
been misapplied. An anaphoric reference may have been improperly coordina-
ted. And so on.
Our purpose in this paper is to develop a sharply contrasting theory
of language comprehension. The theory will be argued with respect to intui-
tively clear cases drawn from previous research. Next, an experiment will be
reported which illustrates a major tenet of the theory. Last, speculative
implications will be drawn for instruction in reading, for instruction in
which students are expected to learn by reading, and for methods of assessing
comprehension of printed material.
Our main thesis is this: the meaning of a communication depends in a
fundamental way on a person's knowledge of the world and his/her analysis of
the context as well as the characteristics of the message. By "meaning" we
intend the full sense of this term including sense, reference, truth value,
illocutionary force, perlocutionary effect, and significance. The scope of
"context" ranges from local linguistic constraints--for instance, gambler's
pick (choice or selection) and miner's pick (ax-like instrument)--to the
physical and social milieu of an utterance.
The meanings of the individual words in a sentence clearly depend upon
the interaction of world knowledge and context. Consider the sense of the
word kicked and the reference of the word ball in the following three sen-
tences (for further examples, see Anderson & Ortony, 1975).
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The baby kicked the ball.
The punter kicked the ball.
The golfer kicked the ball.
Obviously the ball is different in each of these cases. The act of kicking
also changes, and this is a fact that everyone immediately appreciates. Con-
trast the hesitant, uncoordinated, perhaps even accidental kick of the infant
with the smooth, powerful kick of the punter. Golfers don't ordinarily kick
balls; perhaps this one was angry or maybe cheating. In any event, it is
apparent that the golfer's kick is different from the baby's or the punter's.
These are the sorts of inferences we all make routinely.
That the significance of whole sentences is context-sensitive is nicely
illustrated in an example based on Austin (1962), one of the pioneers in
natural language philosophy. Imagine the statement The bull is in the field
in each of the following circumstances. (1) You are driving past the field
in your car. (2) You are sitting in the field having a picnic. (3) You have
brought your pure-bred cow to be inseminated. (4) The sentence comes up on
a screen in a memory experiment in which you are participating. In case (2),
for instance, the statement may signify that you are in danger and had better
run, whereas in (4) it doesn't matter whether there is really a bull in the
field.
Comprehension of words, sentences, and discourse could not be simply a
matter of applying linguistic knowledge. Every act of comprehension involves
one's knowledge of the world as well. Several experiments show that extra-
linguistic knowledge is incorporated into the mental representations for
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sentences (cf. Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Anderson & Ortony, 1975).
For instance, Schweller, Brewer, and Dahl (1976) compared recall of sentences
such as The housewife spoke to the manager about the upcoming baseball game
and The housewife spoke to the manager about the increased meat prices. The
first sentence tended to be recalled pretty much as it had been presented
whereas, as expected, the second sentence often came back The housewife
complained to the manager about the increased meat prices. That the second
declaration had the illocutionary force of a complaint depended upon a chain
of inference that follows from the knowledge that housewives do not like
paying higher prices and that a store manager is proximally responsible for
raising prices. Surely no one would care to claim that all of the informa-
tion needed to make the inferences could be found in the syntax of the
language and the dictionary entries for the constituent words. Thus, it is
apparent that giving the sentence a complaint interpretation hinged on know-
ledge which was not narrowly linguistic. People spontaneously applied know-
ledge of consumer economics and meat market politics.
We conclude, then, that more important than structures which are in
some sense "in" a text are knowledge structures the reader brings to the
text. We shall call these knowledge structures "schemata" following usage
that dates to Sir Fredric Bartlett (1932) and Immanuel Kant (1781) before
him. Others have referred to such structures as "frames" (Minsky, 1975)
or "scripts" (Schank & Abelson, 1975). Schemata represent the generic con-
cepts underlying objects, events, and actions. Schemata are abstract in
the sense that they contain a "variable," "slot," or "place holder" for each
constituent element in the knowledge structure. An important aspect of a
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schema is the specification of the network of relations that hold among the
constituents.
Extensive discussions of schema theory can be found elsewhere (see espe-
cially, Rumelhart & Ortony, 1976). For the sake of the present paper only
a couple of points need to be made. First, it is when the reader has con-
structed a correspondence between relevant schemata and the givens in a
message that s/he has the sense that the message has been comprehended. When
the slots are filled with particular cases a schema is said to be "instantia-
ted." The instantiated cases will be the ones required for the representa-
tion as a whole to make sense. In other words, comprehension of a message
entails filling the slots in the appropriate schemata in such a way as to
jointly satisfy the constraints of the message and the schemata.
A text is never fully explicit. A second claim is that schemata pro-
vide the basis for filling gaps, the basis for inferential elaboration, the
basis for positing states of affairs, not expressly mentioned, that must
hold if a passage is to permit of a coherent interpretation. Comprehension
involves going beyond the givens in a message, so to speak "reading between
the lines." Readers must make logical inferences, pragmatic inferences,
coordinate reference, and supply suppositions about an author's intentions.
They must make inferences about the motives and mental states of characters,
antecedent and consequent events, instrumentality, and illocutionary force
as well as propositional content.
The slots in the schemata from which an individual is trying to build
an interpretation of a message "beg" to be filled. They must be filled,
even when the message contains no direct information, otherwise comprehension
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will fail. That instantiation does occur, and how the process might work,
has been documented by Anderson, Pichert, Goetz, Schallert, Stevens, and
Trollip (in press; see also, Anderson & McGaw, 1973). Sentences were con-
structed with general terms in the subject noun position. The remainder of
each sentence was designed to cause a certain instantiation of the general
term. Here is an example: The woman was outstanding in the theater. Most
people will think of this woman as an actress. Later the cues woman and
actress were presented. The subject was told to respond with the last word
of the related sentence. In each experiment the word naming the expected
instantiation was a substantially better retrieval cue than the general term
which had actually appeared in the sentence. These results are very diffi-
cult to accommodate within any theory that presumes that the meaning of a
sentence is some concantenation of the abstract meanings of the constituent
words.
Controls were included to rule out the interpretation that the results
were due to preexisting associations between the particular terms and the
instantiation-guiding elements of the target sentences. For example, the
sentence The woman worked near the theater does not produce an actress
instantiation, yet actress would be a better cue for theater than woman,
given this sentence, if the association between the former two words were
of overriding importance. This did not turn out to be the case. On the
other hand, the results can be given a straightforward interpretation within
the framework of schema theory: The interplay between the schemata for
theater and outstanding may be supposed to deliver the implication that a
person can be outstanding in the theater by doing an excellent job of acting.
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Therefore, the woman mentioned is likely to be a woman who acts, and a woman
who acts is an actress--hence, the efficacy of the actress cue. The general
point is encapsulated in the slogan; "abstract schemata program individuals
to construct concrete scenarios" (Anderson, 1976).
The third and final claim is that high-level schemata tune people to
see messages in certain ways (Bransford & McCarrell, 1974; Bransford, Nitsch,
& Franks, 1976). The word "see" is intended in an ordinary language sense.
We mean, simply, that at a very early stage in processing high-level schemata
can cause a person to give one interpretation to a passage without even con-
sidering other possible interpretations. To be sure people can consider
alternative interpretations. They no doubt sometimes change interpretations
when it proves difficult to assimilate the text to the schemata first tried,
as for instance happens when a short story has a surprise ending. Nonethe-
less, we shall argue that dominant high-level schemata are often imposed on
text even when, according to a third party point of view, some violence is
done to the "data" contained in the text. The strictly left-to-right, or
"bottom up," theories of reading comprehension proposed by some (Gough, 1972;
LaBerge & Samuels, 1974), which involve a linear progression of processing
from visual input through eventually to a meaning, are not regarded as plausi-
ble. Of course the truth surely lies somewhere in between. Reading could not
be either a top down or a bottom up process; as we have argued here and else-
where (cf. Anderson & Ortony, 1975) it must involve both.
The purpose of the experiment described herein was to determine whether
people from different backgrounds who, therefore, have different systems of
knowledge and belief about the world, would "see" the same text passages in
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different ways. The research used the techniques developed originally by
Schallert (1976). She wrote passages capable of two distinct interpreta-
tions. Contexts in the form of titles biasing the interpretation in one
direction or the other accompanied each passage. Performance on disambigua-
ting multiple-choice tests indicated that context was a powerful determiner
of the interpretations given the passages. Like Schallert, we employed pas-
sages that could be interpreted in more than one way. However, instead of
providing disambiguating contexts, we selected subjects with different back-
grounds. The prediction was that the high-level schemata the subject brought
to the experiment would determine his/her interpretation.
Method
Subjects
The subjects were 30 students from a section of an educational psychol-
ogy course (all female) designed specifically for persons planning a career
in music education, and 30 students from two weight-lifting classes (all
male), who it could be assumed were generally interested in and knowledge-
able about wrestling. Participation in the study was voluntary, though
students in the educational psychology class were required to participate
in some research during the semester. An additional 60 undergraduates
enrolled in an introductory psychology course participated in a subsidiary
study.
Materials
Two passages of about 145 words in length were written. Each could
be given at least two distinct interpretations. Pilot data indicated that
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the typical person interprets the first passage as about a convict planning
his escape from prison, though it can be interpreted as about a wrestler
trying to break the hold of an opponent. This will be called the Prison/
Wrestling passage.
Rocky slowly got up from the mat, planning his escape. He hesi-
tated a moment and thought. Things were not going well. What
bothered him most was being held, especially since the charge
against him had been weak. He considered his present situation.
The lock that held him was strong but he thought he could break
it. He knew, however, that his timing would have to be perfect.
Rocky was aware that it was because of his early roughness that
he had been penalized so severely--much too severely from his
point of view. The situation was becoming frustrating; the
pressure had been grinding on him for too long. He was being
ridden unmercifully. Rocky was getting angry now. He felt he
was ready to make his move. He knew that his success or failure
would depend on what he did in the next few seconds.
Preliminary research indicated that the second passage is usually interpreted
as about a group of friends coming together to play cards. The alternative
interpretation is in terms of a rehearsal session of a woodwind ensemble.
This text will be called the Card/Music passage.
Every Saturday night, four good friends get together. When Jerry,
Mike, and Pat arrived, Karen was sitting in her living room
writing some notes. She quickly gathered the cards and stood
up to greet her friends at the door. They followed her into the
living room but as usual they couldn't agree on exactly what to
play. Jerry eventually took a stand and set things up. Finally,
they began to play. Karen's recorder filled the room with soft
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and pleasant music. Early in the evening, Mike noticed Pat's
hand and the many diamonds. As the night progressed the tempo
of play increased. Finally, a lull in the activities occurred.
Taking advantage of this, Jerry pondered the arrangement in front
of him. Mike interrupted Jerry's reverie and said, "Let's hear
the score." They listened carefully and commented on their per-
formance. When the comments were all heard, exhausted but happy,
Karen's friends went home.
Ten multiple-choice questions were generated for each of the two pas-
sages. Each question had two correct answers, one for each interpretation.
One of the distractors was consistent with one of the expected interpreta-
tions, the other with the second interpretation. A sample question for each
paragraph follows:
Prison/Wrestling passage
How had Rocky been punished for his aggressiveness?
A) He had been demoted to the "B" team.
B) His opponent had been given points.
C) He lost his privileges for the weekend.
D) He had been arrested and imprisoned.
Card/Music passage
What did the four people comment on?
A) The odds of having so many high cards.
B) The sound of their music.
C) The high cost of musical instruments.
D) How well they were playing cards.
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Design and Procedure
Subjects participated in groups ranging from 2 to 15. They read the
first passage, completed an interpolated vocabulary test, attempted a free
recall of the first passage, read the second passage, worked on another form
of the vocabulary test, attempted a free recall of the second passage, and
then completed the multiple-choice tests for both passages. Passage order
was counterbalanced. The order of the multiple-choice tests matched passage
order. Finally, subjects completed a debriefing questionnaire and autobio-
graphical inventory. The items in the inventory were intended to tap matters
which could be expected to relate to the interpretations given to the pas-
sages. Sample questions: Do you have a close relative who is a law enforce-
ment officer? Have you ever attended a wrestling match? How much do you
enjoy playing cards? What does "forte" mean? Will your career depend in
any way on music?
Materials were bound into experimental booklets in the order in which
they were to be completed. Subjects were allowed 1.5 minutes to read each
passage, 6 minutes for each version of the vocabulary test, and 5 minutes
for each recall test. The multiple-choice tests, questionnaire, and inven-
tory were subject paced.
Results
Performance on Multiple-Choice Tests
Table 1 contains the mean proportions of answers correct according to
the nondominant or secondary interpretation of the passages; in other words,
a wrestling interpretation of the Prison/Wrestling passage and a music
Frameworks for Comprehending Discourse
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interpretation of the Card/Music passage. It should be emphasized that to
get a high score the subject had to learn and remember the information in
the passage, not merely view it from a certain perspective. Analysis of
Insert Table 1 about here
variance indicated, as expected, that there was a significant (a = .01 for
this and all subsequent tests of significance) interaction between passage
and subjects' background, F(1,58) = 48.61. Neither passage nor background
had an overall effect. However, both simple main effects were significant;
physical education students gave more correct wrestling-consistent answers
than music students on the Prison/Wrestling test, t(58) = 5.60, whereas
the reverse was true with respect to correct music-consistent answers on
the Card/Music test, t(58) = 6o53.
When correct answers from both perspectives were counted, there was a
significant effect for passage, F(1,58) = 19o27, but not for background of
the subject or the interaction of passage and background. This means that
the sheer amount of information acquired did not depend on the interpreta-
tion given. Figure 1 shows that scores on the multiple choice tests formed
Insert Figure 1 about here
a U-shaped distribution. The graph contains the number of responses correct
according to the nondominant interpretation divided by the responses that
are correct according to either interpretation. Thus, a low score reflects
a dominant interpretation, a middle score a mixed interpretation, and a
high score a nondominant interpretation. Figure 1 was constructed from
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pooled data, but the distributions were the same when passages and groups
were considered separately. It is evident that most subjects gave each
passage one distinct interpretation or the other.
Total idea units recalled. The passages were parsed into idea units
and scored for gist or substance. Based on independent scorings of 12
randomly chosen protocols interrater agreement was .70. The only signifi-
cant result was the main effect for passage, F(1,58) = 7.34. Subjects re-
called a mean proportion of .36 of the idea units in the Card/Music passage
and .31 of the units in the Prison/Wrestling passage. The failure to find
any significant effects involving subjects' background indicates that this
factor did not influence the total amount learned and remembered.
Theme-revealing disambiguations and intrusions. A disambiguation is
a paraphrase of an idea unit that clearly shows the subject's underlying
interpretation. A theme-revealing intrusion is a phrase or sentence not
directly related to any idea unit in a passage. Table 2 gives examples of
Insert Table 2 about here
theme-revealing disambiguations and intrusions. The ratio of total dis-
ambiguations to total number of idea units recalled that any subject dis-
ambiguated was .17. In other words, disambiguations occurred about one
out of every six possible times. Looking at the data another way, one or
more disambiguations appeared in .69 of the protocols. The comparable
figure for intrusions was .26.
Fisher exact tests indicated that theme-revealing disambiguations and
intrusions were significantly related to subjects' backgrounds in the manner
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that would be expected. More physical education than music students revealed
in their protocols a wrestling interpretation of the Prison/Wrestling pas-
sage and a card interpretation of the Card/Music passage. Whereas, more
music than physical education students included material showing a prison
interpretation of the Prison/Wrestling passage and a music interpretation of
the Card/Music passage.
As a check on the internal consistency of the data, disambiguations and
intrusions that appeared in free recall were compared to performance on the
multiple choice tests. When the subjects' interpretations of the passages
were classified by splitting multiple choice scores at the median, 92.4% of
the disambiguations and intrusions were consistent with this classification.
Many of the inconsistent cases appeared to be attributable to a couple of
arbitrary conventions for coding disambiguations. For example, the sentence
from the Card/Music passage, Mike noticed Pat's hand and the many diamonds,
was always scored as a music disambiguation if the subject indicated that
diamonds referred to precious stones, but, of course, a card player can wear
a diamond ring or bracelet as well as have a long diamond suit. When this
and one other idea unit were discounted, 96.1% of the disambiguations and
theme-revealing intrusions were consistent with the classifications based on
the multiple choice tests.
Autobiographical inventory. Multiple regression analyses were done for
each passage using the relevant questions from the inventory as the predic-
tors. The multiple choice score was the criterion variable. Multiple corre-
lations of .52 and .79 were obtained for the Prison/Wrestling and Card/Music
passage's, respectively.
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A subsidiary study was completed with a heterogeneous, unselected sample
of subjects to confirm that it is possible to predict from background infor-
mation the interpretation that will be given to a passage. A total of 60
undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course read the Card/
Music passage, completed the multiple choice test, and filled out a modified
version of the autobiographical inventory. The multiple correlation between
the items on the inventory and performance on the multiple choice test was .53.
We have no doubt that were we to develop more extensive background and
interest inventories, engage in empirical trial and error, employ more so-
phisticated techniques to wring error out of the data, and so on, it would
eventually be possible to predict interpretations of these passages with a
very high degree of accuracy. But accounting for more variance would serve
no useful purpose. The point of theoretical importance is made by the analy-
ses in hand: the interpretation people give to messages is influenced by
their backgrounds.
Debriefing questionnaire. The main issue we wished to investigate with
the debriefing questionnaire was whether subjects became aware that there
was more than one possible interpretation of a passage. Subjects were asked,
"Were you aware of another interpretation for either passage? If so, what
was it?" If the answer to the first question was "yes," the subject was
also asked when s/he became aware of the alternative. Averaging across the
two passages, 62% of the subjects reported that another interpretation never
occurred to them, while an additional 20% said they became aware of an alter-
native during the multiple choice test or when responding to the debriefing
questionnaire. Less than 20% said they were aware of a second interpretation
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while reading a passage. The figures just cited include only subjects who
wrote down a sensible alternative interpretation on the debriefing ques-
tionnaire. Only 23% would be counted as being aware of another interpre-
tation during initial reading, even if the requirement of providing a co-
herent statement of the second theme were dropped.
Discussion
Converging evidence obtained in the present study indicates that people's
personal history, knowledge, and belief influence the interpretations that
they will give to prose passages. There was a striking relationship be-
tween the special interest group of which a subject was a member and his/her
scores on disambiguating multiple choice tests. Theme-revealing disambigua-
tions and intrusions in free recall showed equally strong relationships to
the subject's background. Items from an autobiographical inventory were
good predictors of the interpretations that were given to passages. Taken
together, these results support unequivocally the claim that high-level
schemata provide the interpretive framework for comprehending discourse.
The data were consistent with the second claim that high-level schemata
cause people to "see" messages in certain ways. The fact that U-shaped
distributions of scores appeared on the multiple choice tests indicates
that subjects generally gave a passage one distinct and consistent interpre-
tation or another. Most telling were the reports on the debriefing ques-
tionnaire. Over 80% of the subjects reported being unaware of an alterna-
tive interpretation when reading a passage. Because of the dominance of
behaviorism over the past half century, American social scientists tend to
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be suspicious of self-reports. This is a methodological prescript that ought
to be thrown on the scrap heap. When one talks to individual subjects, as
we have done, one is persuaded that they can reflect accurately on their
mental processes. Our data are suggestive at the very least. The possibil-
ity that high-level schemata can influence a person to impose one framework
on a message, without deliberately or even subconsciously considering others,
deserves to be seriously entertained.
In his classic book, Remembering, Bartlett (1932) argued that language
comprehension is a constructive process and that memory for linguistic mate-
rial is reconstructive in character. As evidence, Bartlett recounted informal
analyses of attempts to recall the story, The War of the Ghosts, reporting
intrusions and distortions that did not have even an inferential basis in
the text. Bartlett (1932, p. 204) concluded, "The first notion to get rid
of is that memory is primarily or literally reduplicative, or reproductive
. . In the many thousands of cases of remembering which I have collected
S. . literal recall was very rare." However, a review by Spiro (1976)
indicates that researchers following Bartlett generally have been unable
to replicate his finding of gross inaccuracy. Recall tends to be confined
to explicit text elements and inferences logically derivable from text ele-
ments. Indeed, Zangwill (1972) concluded that the data were sufficient to
reject Bartlett's theory.
The present study and several other recent ones (Brown, 1976; Spiro,
1976; Sulin & Dooling, 1974) do show predictable intrusions from the subjects'
knowledge of the world. How are these findings to be reconciled with the
results obtained by most other investigators in the forty-five years since
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Bartlett's book was first published? Schema theory provides a simple answer.
Intrusions appear and ambiguous material is distorted in order to place the
message and subsuming schemata in correspondence. Distortions and intrusions
will appear only when there is a lack of correspondence between the schemata
embodied in the text and the schemata by which the reader assimilated the
text. This can happen when the text is incompletely specified and the reader
fills the gaps (Johnson, Bransford, & Soloman, 1973; Kintsch, 1972); when the
set of relations expected on the basis of a schema is deliberately distorted
by the author (Spiro, 1976); when the schemata employed by the reader are
incongruent with the schemata of the author; or finally when the text is
capable of being assimilated to more than one high-level schemata, as in the
present study. Most investigators have employed passages in which author,
reader, and later the persons who scored the recall protocols have shared
schemata, and thus have given common interpretations of the passages. Meyer
(1975) is no doubt right when she says that Bartlett observed many intrusions
because of the bizzare nature of his stories, but she is wrong to dismiss
his results for this reason. Bizzare and ambiguous passages are useful tools
for making transparent the role played by knowledge of the world in language
comprehension. However, there is no reason to suppose that it is only when
attempting to understand passages of this sort that subjects bring to bear
extralinguistic knowledge. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that
language comprehension always involves using one's knowledge of the world.
We turn now to several interesting implications of schema theory for
education. Consider first speculative implications for reading instruction.
It may turn out that many problems in reading comprehension are traceable to
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deficits in knowledge rather than deficits in linguistic skill narrowly con-
ceived; that is, that young readers sometimes may not possess the schemata
needed to comprehend passages. Or, they may possess relevant schemata but
not know how to bring them to bear. Or, they may not be facile at changing
schemata when the first one tried proves inadequate; they may, in other words,
get stuck in assimilating text to inappropriate, incomplete, or inconsistent
schemata. Worst of all, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the frequent
demand for veridical reproduction in oral and written exercises may bias
children against bringing high-level schemata into play at all. For if the
child seriously brings his/her own knowledge to bear s/he will, from an adult
point of view, often make mistakes. It is the teacher's responsibility to
purge errors. Thus, children may sometimes learn from the very lessons inten-
ded to upgrade comprehension skills that its best to play it safe, to read
word by word and line by line.
From the perspective of schema theory, the principal determinant of the
knowledge a person can acquire from reading is the knowledge s/he already
possesses. The schemata by which people attempt to assimilate text will
surely vary according to age, subculture, experience, education, interests,
and belief systems. Merely laying on a new set of propositions will not
necessarily change high-level schemata. Wyer (1976) has summarized social
psychological evidence in support of this premise, indicating that it is
"likely that the implications of new information will be resisted if its
acceptance would require a major cognitive reorganization, that is, if it
would require a change in a large number of other logically related beliefs
in order to maintain consistency among them." Apparent inconsistencies and
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counterexamples often are easily assimilated into the schemata a person holds
dear. Or, it may be possible for a student to maintain the particular iden-
tity of lesson material, keeping it segregated from logically incompatible
beliefs.
Experience in helping to revise an introductory college economics course
has suggested that the typical freshman or sophomore comes to class with a
point of view more akin to Adam Smith than John Maynard Keynes. Our conjec-
ture is that many students can complete an economics course, acquiring a large
amount of information and a number of concepts and principles in a piece-meal
fashion, without integrating the new learnings into existing knowledge struc-
tures, and without understanding the Weltanschauung of contemporary economics.
Driver and Easley (1969) and Driver (1973) found that people have a
comparable difficulty in acquiring the conceptual frameworks of physics.
They interrogated gifted high school physics students about the movement of
balls, launched by a spring plunger, along a horizontal track. While students
used the terminology of Newtonian mechanics, such as "force," "momentum," and
"impulse," many of them "manifested the Aristotelian notion that constant
force is required to produce constant motion." Driver and Easley (1969,
p. 1) concluded "that the student . . has already developed many concepts
from his experience with the physical world, which influence his understanding
of the new evidence and arguments . . ." Driver (1973, pp. 423-424) added
that, "The belief system they use in school to pass examinations and satisfy
the teacher . . . may never be related to that which is used in everyday expe-
rience."
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We shall note, finally, an implication of schema theory for the assess-
ment of comprehension. The fact that theme-revealing disambiguations do
appear, and that these are significantly related to the subject's back-
ground, has been stressed. But perhaps an equally important point is how
difficult it is to tell from a recall protocol what interpretation a subject
has given to a passage. Most subjects gave one distinct interpretation or
another to each passageo Yet nearly one third of the protocols contained no
clear indication of the underlying interpretation. Our passages were written
to permit of starkly contrasting interpretations. The manifest differences
between, say, a classical and a Keynesian view of economics would probably
be much more subtle. This is a point of major significance for the assess-
ment of comprehension. As both Spiro (1976) and Anderson (1976) have argued,
the teacher has his/her schemata, too. The easy assimilation is that "mis-
takes" and "gaps" in an essay answer are blemishes rather than signs of what
is possibly a wholly different point of view.
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Table 1
Mean Proportions Correct on the Multiple Choice Tests
Subjects' background
Passage Physical Education Music
Prison/Wrestling .64 .28
Card/Music .29 .71
Note:--Tests scored for answers correct on the
basis of the nondominant interpretation. A high score
reflects a wrestling interpretation of the Prison/
Wrestling passage and a music interpretation of the
Card/Music passage.
Frameworks for Comprehending Discourse
28
Table 2
Examples of Theme-Revealing Disambiguations and Intrusions
Prison theme
Rocky sat in his cell.
He was angry that he had been caught and arrested.
Wrestling theme
Rocky is wrestling .
Rocky was penalized early in the match for roughness or a dangerous hold . .
Card theme
She is playing with a deck of cards.
Mike sees that Pat's hand has a lot of hearts.
Music theme
Mike brought out the stand and began to set things up.
As usual they couldn't decide on the piece of music to play.
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Figure Caption
Figure 1. Distribution of multiple choice test scores.
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